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1 Introduction
Economists are interested in estimating firm-level productivity in a range of fields. These
estimates are often used as inputs in a number of applications such as the firm size distri-
bution, firm survival and growth, self-selection of firms into export status and the extensive
and intensive margins of trade to name a few. In the literature, the most commonly used
approach to estimate productivity involves estimating a production function by regressing
output quantity on input quantity and using the resulting residual shock as a productivity
index typically referred to as Total Factor Productivity (TFP). This raises at least three
issues.1
First, most studies do not have output quantity data available at the firm-level so that
regressions are fitted using revenue data, i.e., price times quantity. Second, a well known
issue is the endogeneity of production factors used as explanatory variables. Third and more
importantly, firms could be heterogeneous in dimensions other than technical efficiency. For
example, the presence of vertical differentiation means that firms selling otherwise similar
products face rather different demands. At the same time market power variations, due to
product quality or technical efficiency, could substantially affect the markup that firms can
charge. Importantly, it is also possible that differences in markups are not fully captured by
quality and/or efficiency. Being able to account for these different dimensions is important
for several reasons. First, it is crucial in order to correctly measure TFP. Second, being able
to actually quantify them is important from both a welfare and a policy point of view. From
a welfare perspective it is, for example, of great value to assess the impact on firm markups
of a trade integration episode or market size expansion. Some recent theoretical papers have
indeed revisited the relationship between market size, markups and welfare and questioned
the pervasiveness of the so called “pro-competitive effects” (Dhingra and Morrow, 2012 and
Zhelobodko et al., 2012). Furthermore, being able to disentangle efficiency from quality is
important for policy matters and in particular to understand where the competitiveness of a
firm or an industry comes from and then target interventions accordingly.
This paper’s contribution is to address these three issues in a more comprehensive way than
the existing literature. More specifically, we propose a framework that simultaneously allows
recovering productivity, demand, and markups heterogeneity across firms, while leaving the
1There are at least two other important issues related to TFP estimation. The first one is that input
quantity data at the firm-level is typically not available and input expenditure is used instead. The second
is that many firms are actually multi-product and so the problem of how to assign inputs to specific outputs
needs to be addressed. In this paper we focus, for better comparability with previous studies, on single-product
firms and do not deal with these two issues. Future research will expand in this direction. See De Loecker
et al. (2015) for a joint treatment of input price bias and multi-product firms. See also Atalay (2014) for a
quantification of the input price bias and Grieco et al. (2014) for a parsimonious methodology to deal with
such a bias.
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correlation among the three unrestricted.2 We do this by systematically exploiting many of the
assumptions that are implicit in most previous firm-level productivity estimation approaches.
In our framework we model demand heterogeneity as shocks shifting demand in a way that
is complementary to heterogeneity in markups and that can be interpreted as a measure
of quality of a firm’s products. In doing so we improve upon existing studies that either
ignore one or several dimensions of heterogeneity or address some of the issues but in a fairly
restrictive way. For example, Klette and Griliches (1996) recover TFP while having some
demand shocks in the background but impose homogenous markups across firms. Other
approaches, such as De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and Dobbelaere and Mairesse (2013)
estimate both TFP and markups but, again, keep demand shocks in the background. More
specifically, demand shocks are treated as something to be simply controlled for and cannot
be quantified within these frameworks. Papers such as Foster et al. (2008) measure both TFP
and demand shocks but impose constant markups and zero correlation between demand and
productivity shocks.
We apply our econometric framework to Belgian manufacturing firms and use information
on both the quantity and the value of production3 over the period 1996-2007 to quantify
productivity, markups and demand shocks. We first document that demand shocks display
at least as much variability across firms as productivity shocks. We further show that pro-
ductivity and demand shocks are very strongly and negatively correlated in each of the four
industries we consider. This finding is suggestive of a trade-off between the quality of a firm’s
products and their production cost. Consider, for example, the car industry where there is
the co-existence of manufacturers (like Nissan) producing many cars for a given amount of
inputs (high productivity) and manufacturers (like Mercedes) producing less cars for a given
amount of inputs (low productivity). To be more specific one of the most productive car
plants in Europe is the Nissan factory located in Sunderland in the UK. In terms of sheer
productivity measured as cars per employee it is nearly 100% more productive than a state
of the art Mercedes plant near Rastatt in Germany. However, this hardly reflects a problem
with the Mercedes plant. Rather, Mercedes and Nissan face quite different demands which
leads to different prices as well as different markups. Both plants are profitable and perhaps
generate a very similar revenue productivity. Yet, their business model is rather different.
Another pattern worth noting is that differences in markups across firms are reasonably
well explained (in terms of R2) by differences in demand shocks, productivity shocks and
production scale. However, there remains a considerable amount of unexplained variation.
2In a related paper Atkin et al. (2015) use information on costs, markups and prices as directly reported
by firms to analyze a cluster of soccer-ball manufacturers in Pakistan.
3When only revenue data is available one can still identify markups as well as a composite of demand and
TFP shocks. With firm-level output data one can, in addition, distinguish between TFP and demand shocks.
See Martin (2014).
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Therefore, markups are far from being a residual dimension of heterogeneity in the data.
We also show how revenue-based productivity can be decomposed into the three dimensions
of heterogeneity and find that variation in revenue TFP is actually attributable mainly to
variation in demand and markups across firms rather than in quantity TFP. Demand shocks
typically explain more variation than markups.
We finally assess how and to what extent our three dimensions of heterogeneity allow
us to gain deeper and sharper insights into two key firm-level outcomes: export status and
size. We start by showing that the usual positive correlation between revenue-based TFP
and export status holds in our data. The availability of physical quantity data allows us to
also look at the correlation between quantity-based TFP and export status. We find this
correlation to be positive, providing support to the mainstream theoretical framework based
on differences across firms in term of their ability to turn inputs into output. Yet, within
our framework we can go even further and ask whether - and how - demand and markups
heterogeneity also matters and how it interacts with heterogeneity in productivity. First, we
confirm that the positive correlation between quantity-based TFP and firm export status is
robust to the inclusion of demand and markups heterogeneity. Second, we find that demand
is more important than productivity in drawing the line between exporting and non-exporting
firms. We also find that exporting firms typically sell higher quality goods and charge lower
markups. When considering firm size, as measured by the number of employees, we show that
the positive correlation between revenue-based TFP and size commonly found in the literature
equally holds in our data. We also find that the positive correlation between quantity-based
TFP and size is robust to including demand shocks and markups heterogeneity. However,
demand and markups heterogeneity are as important as productivity in understanding why
some firms are larger than others.
Our paper is related to the literature on firm TFP measurement on which Olley and
Pakes (1996) has had a deep impact. The key endogeneity issue addressed in Olley and Pakes
(1996) is omitted variables: the firm observes and takes decisions based on productivity shocks
that are unobservable to the econometrician. Yet, the econometrician observes firm decisions
(investments) that do not impact productivity today and that can (under certain conditions)
be used as a proxy for productivity shocks. This proxy variable approach to tackle the issue of
unobservable productivity shocks has been further developed in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003)
and Ackerberg et al. (2015) and represents the current dominant framework.
In a recent paper De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) have extended this framework by ex-
plicitly allowing for another dimension of heterogeneity in the model, namely firm-specific
markups, while providing an estimation strategy to separately identify productivity and
markups. Building on Hall (1986) they show that, for a variety of market structures, there
is a simple relationship between markups, the output elasticity of a variables input and the
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share of that input’s expenditure in total sales. This simple relationship allows them to read-
ily compute firm-level markups from estimates of the parameters of the production function.
In order to estimate the production function they build on Ackerberg et al. (2015) and use
revenue data.
However, this approach is consistent if the only unobserved driver of variations in prices
- and thus markups - are the productivity shocks or rather demand shocks for which the
researcher happens to have good proxies for. In order to improve upon De Loecker and
Warzynski (2012) we need to make some explicit assumptions about the market structure. In
our main specification we propose a monopolistic competition approach featuring generalized
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. It turns out that this does not only allow introducing separate
demand and productivity shocks, but in addition we can also allow for a possibly entirely
independent third markup shock. In other words, our method can allow for markups that are
either entirely determined by productivity and demand shocks or are entirely independent
from these other shocks - or a combination of the previous two cases. We further show in
Appendices A and B that our approach can be generalised to consider preferences other than
the generalised Dixit Stiglitz as well as alternative forms of imperfect competition like, for
example, the framework developed in Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
Our interest in demand shocks is common to both De Loecker (2011) and Foster et al.
(2008). De Loecker (2011) introduces demand shocks in a revenue-based production function
model while relying on CES preferences and a common markup across varieties. This allows
substituting for prices and getting a tractable expression for firm revenue as a function of
inputs, TFP and demand shocks. Compared to our framework, De Loecker (2011) only re-
quires revenue data but does not allow for different markups across varieties while needing
some adequate proxies for demand shocks. By contrast, Foster et al. (2008) use data on both
the quantity and the value of a firm’s production in order to disentangle productivity shocks
from demand shocks. More specifically, they focus on homogeneous goods and recover pro-
duction function coefficients from industry average cost shares. They subsequently estimate
a demand system featuring demand shocks measured as regression residuals and instrument
firm price with firm TFP. Therefore, the identifying assumption allowing them to disentangle
productivity shocks from demand shocks is that they are uncorrelated. In our framework
we do not impose such an assumption. We instead draw on the structure we impose on
the underlying firm behavior to disentangle the two shocks. In doing so we find them to be
very strongly correlated with each other suggesting that, in our data, Foster et al. (2008)’s
assumption of a zero correlation between productivity shocks and demand shocks is severely
violated.
When comparing our measures with those obtained from other approaches, we find big
differences in demand shocks but not much with respect to TFP and markups. As far as
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demand shocks are concerned there are two reasons why our shocks should be expected to
be different from those of Foster et al. (2008). Foster et al. (2008) impose constant markups
across firms and zero correlation between demand shocks and productivity shocks. We relax
both assumptions and show that, though positively correlated (in between 0.2 and 0.4), the
two sets of demand shocks are very different and can thus potentially lead to quite different
conclusions when used to answer a specific research question.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides our baseline econometric
model and estimation procedure. We present our data in Section 3 while Section 4 contains
estimation results as well as some descriptive statistics and correlations. We compare our
measures with measures obtained from other approaches in Section 5 while in Section 6 we
show how our framework can be used to get fresh insights into two key firm-level outcomes:
export status and size. Section 7 concludes. Finally, in the Appendix we show how to
extend our analysis to more general preferences, forms of imperfect competition other than
monopolistic competition as well as to a wider set of production functions and processes for
productivity and demand shocks.
2 Baseline model and estimation procedure
2.1 The Model
2.1.1 Production
Consider a Cobb-Douglas production technology4 with 3 production factors: labour (L),
materials (M) and capital (K). Whereas labour and materials are perfectly flexible, capital
is fixed in the short-run. We assume firms minimize costs and take the price of labour (WL)
and materials (WM) as given. Consequently, at any given point in time, each firm i is dealing
with the following short-run cost minimization problem:5
min
Li,Mi
{LiWL +MiWM} s.t. Qi = AiLαLi MαMi Kγ−αM−αLi .
where Ai is an idiosyncratic productivity shock observable to the firm but not the econo-
metrician that we characterize in Section 2.2. First order conditions to this problem imply
that:
4We do not need to assume constant returns to scale (γ=1). It is also relatively straightforward to adapt
the model to more general production technologies. See Appendix C for more details.
5To simplify notation we do not use time indices unless needed to avoid ambiguity. We also ignore
components that are constant across firms in a given time period as they will be controlled for by time
dummies.
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Wx = χi
Qi
Xxi
αx (1)
for x ∈ {L,M} where Xxi is either the amount of labour or of materials used by firm i and
χi is a Lagrange multiplier. Once solved for χi
6 we can write the short-run cost function as:
Ci = χi
Qi
WL
αLWL + χi
Qi
WM
αMWM = χiQi (αL + αM)
=
(
Qi
Ai
) 1
αL+αM
(
WL
αL
) αL
αL+αM
(
WM
αM
) αM
αL+αM
K
1− γ
αM+αL
i (αL + αM) . (2)
Marginal cost thus satisfies the following property:
∂Ci
∂Qi
=
1
αL + αM
Ci
Qi
. (3)
2.1.2 Demand and market structure
We consider a monopolistically competitive industry7 populated by a continuum of firms each
producing one variety of a differentiated good. Each firm faces an idiosyncratic demand for
its own variety and maximises profits while taking market aggregates as given. Demand
heterogeneity across firms is characterized by a measure of consumers’ appreciation of a
particular product (Λi) that is observable to the firm but not the econometrician. We further
allow firms to face different elasticities of demand.
We impose that Λi enters preferences in such a way that demand for product i satisfies
the property:
∂lnPi
∂lnΛi
=
∂lnPi
∂lnQi
+ 1 (4)
where ∂lnPi
∂lnQi
≡ − 1
ηi
and ηi is the elasticity of demand. As it will be better appreciated
later on (4) is a very useful property allowing us to write firm revenue as a simple function
of the markup, Λi and quantity.
Note that, for example, (4) is automatically satisfied if preferences over varieties of a
representative consumer have a direct utility representation and the consumer pays a price
Pi to consume quantity Qi who enters utility as Q˜i = ΛiQi. In this sense Λi is a measure
of vertical differentiation or quality.8 We characterize the stochastic process driving Λi (as
6χi = Q
1
αL+αM
−1
i A
− 1αL+αM
i
(
WL
αL
) αL
αM+αL
(
WM
αM
) αM
αM+αL K
1− γαM+αL
i .
7We show in Appendix B how our approach can be generalised to alternative forms of imperfect competition
like, for example, the framework developed in Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
8As discussed in Di Comite et al. (2014) clear definitions of horizontal and vertical differentiation until now
only exist in discrete choice models with indivisible varieties and with consumers making mutually exclusive
choices. Many discrete choice models actually incorporate both types of differentiation (Anderson et al.,
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well as the one for Ai) in Section 2.2 while in Appendix A we provide more insights on the
interpretation of Λi and about preferences generating demand satisfying (4).
A simple but flexible case satisfying (4) is the generalized CES preferences structure intro-
duced by Spence (1976)9 that we adopt throughout this section. In our baseline specification
a representative consumer demand is thus obtained from the following problem:
max
Q
{∫
i∈I
ηi
ηi − 1 (ΛiQi)
ηi−1
ηi di
}
s.t.
∫
i
PiQidi = B
where B is the budget, Q is a vector with elements Qi and the set of varieties is denoted by
I. The first order condition to this problem implies:
Piκ = Λ
ηi−1
ηi
i Q
− 1
ηi
i (5)
where κ is a Lagrange multiplier. Re-arranging suggests that firm-level demand is:
Qi = P
−ηi
i Λ
ηi−1
i κ
−ηi .
Profit maximization of firm i then requires:
Pi = µi
∂Ci
∂Qi
(6)
where the markup of firm i is simply a function of the elasticity of demand: µi =
ηi
ηi−1 .
2.1.3 Some key properties
Here, we derive some useful properties that we will use in Section 2.2 to manipulate equations.
First, from (1), (2), (3) and (6) we have:
αx =
XxiWx
χiQi
=
XxiWx
Ci
αL+αM
=
XxiWx
Pi
µi
Qi
.
Therefore,
αx
µi
=
XxiWx
PiQi
≡ sxi (7)
where sxi is the expenditure share of factor x ∈ {L,M} in firm i revenue. This means that,
for example, materials’ expenditure share is equal to the the output elasticity of materials
1992). In contrast, a clear distinction between horizontal (taste) and vertical (quality) differentiation is to
a great extent absent in models where consumers have a love-for variety and purchase many products in
different quantities. As in Di Comite et al. (2014) our model has features including both horizontal and
vertical differentiation, which Di Comite et al. (2014) refer to as “verti-zontal”.
9See Appendix A for further details.
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(the constant αM) divided by the markup µi.
10 This is a very convenient property delivering
a simple way to measure markups:
µi =
αM
sMi
. (8)
From (8) it is clear that the markup of a firm will be a scaling of the inverse of its materials’
expenditure share. Such a share is typically observable in the data and does not require any
estimation. However, we do need to estimate αM in order to measure markups level.
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As already anticipated, the way we introduce demand heterogeneity in (4) is also very
useful. From now onwards we denote with small case the log of a variable (for example λ
denotes the natural logarithm of Λ). Note that using µi =
ηi
ηi−1 as well as (5) we can write
log revenue, up to an innocuous constant, as:12
ri = qi + pi =
1
µi
(qi + λi) . (9)
Equation (9) thus shows we can rewrite the revenue equation as a simple function of the
markup as well as of the quantity and the demand shock. By substituting qi with the formula
of the Cobb-Douglas we can transform this further as:
ri =
αL
µi
(li − ki) + αM
µi
(mi − ki) + γ
µi
ki +
1
µi
(ai + λi) .
Furthermore, by using (7) and (8), we finally get:
LHSi ≡ ri − sLi (li − ki)− sMi (mi − ki)
sMi
=
γ
αM
ki +
1
αM
(ai + λi) . (10)
There are two important features of (10). First, the entire left-hand side (LHSi) is made
up of variables that are fully observable. Second, on the right hand side we have some key
parameters (γ and αM), log capital ki (which is given for a firm in the short-run) and two
unobservable endogenous variables (that are known to the firm and drive its choices of inputs
and pricing while being unobservable to the econometrician) entering linearly and with the
same coefficient. By imposing enough structure to the process driving ai and λi, which we do
next, (10) will allow us to estimate some key parameters.
10See Hall (1986) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) for more general frameworks delivering this prop-
erty.
11Note that in what follows we do not need to specify the stochastic process driving µi nor spell out a
specific relationship with Ai and Λi. Our framework allows for markups that are either entirely determined
by productivity and demand shocks or are entirely independent from these other shocks or a combination of
the previous two cases. See Appendix A for further details.
12Equation (9) holds as an equality in the generalized CES preferences structure we consider here. In other
cases it holds as a local approximation. See Appendix A for further details.
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2.2 Estimation Procedure
We now use the time index and assume, as it is typically done in models featuring unobservable
productivity shocks, that ait evolves over time as stochastic Markov processes. We further
assume that λit can also be described by a Markov process:
13
ait = φa ait−1 + νait
λit = φλλit−1 + νλit (11)
where νait and νλit can be correlated with each other. Before substituting (11) into (10) we
need to find a convenient way to express ait−1 and λit−1. By using (8) and (9) we have:
λit−1 = rit−1µit−1 − qit−1 = rit−1 αM
sMit−1
− qit−1. (12)
At the same time plugging (12) into (10) and re-arranging yields:
ait−1 = αMLHSit−1 − γkit−1 −
(
rit−1
αM
sMit−1
− qit−1
)
. (13)
Finally, by substituting (11) to (13) into (10) we obtain:
LHSit =
γ
αM
kit + φaLHSit−1 − φa γ
αM
kit−1
+ (φλ − φa)
(
rit−1
sMit−1
− 1
αM
qit−1
)
+
1
αM
(νait + νλit) . (14)
Equation (14) is key because it allows identifying two key parameters: γ
αM
≡ β and φa.
As will become clearer later on, it turns out that we do not actually need to estimate all of
the model parameters to get measures of productivity shocks, demand shocks and markups.
Indeed β, φa and γ are sufficient. Using the revenue equation (14) we get estimates for
β and φa. Using the additional information provided by the quantity equation described
below, along with estimates βˆ and φˆa, we will in turn be able to estimate the returns to scale
parameter γ.
13In Section 4.3 we provide evidence supporting the Markov process assumption for λit. For simplicity we
assume here that both the ait λit processes are linear, i.e., together they are a VAR(1) process. We could,
however, allow for more complex non-linear Markov processes as well as for firm fixed effects and measurement
error in capital. See Appendix D for further details. One could also build on Doraszelski and Jaumandreu
(2013) to draw an explicit link between various forms of R&D (like product and process) and the productivity
and quality process we use here. Indeed, our model shares quite a few features and assumptions with the one
developed in Doraszelski and Jaumandreu (2013).
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There are various way of estimating (14) and here we use perhaps the simplest one. More
specifically, we rewrite (14) as the following linear regression:
LHSit = b1z1it + b2z2it + b3z3it + b4z4it + b5z5it + uit (15)
where z1it=kit, z2it=LHSit−1, z3it=kit−1, z4it=
rit−1
sMit−1
, z5it=qit−1, uit= 1αM (νait + νλit) as well
as b1=β, b2=φa, b3=−φaβ, b4=(φλ − φa) and b5=− (φλ − φa) 1αM . Given our assumptions,
the error term uit in (15) is uncorrelated with all of the regressors. Therefore (15) can
be estimated via simple OLS. After doing this we set βˆ=bˆ1 and φˆa=bˆ2 and do not exploit
parameters’ constraints in the estimation.14
We now turn to estimating γ. Equation (7) implies αL = µitsLit and αM = µitsMit. Firm
log output qit can thus be written as:
qit = µitsLit (lit − kit) + µitsMit (mit − kit) + γkit + ait. (16)
Further using (8) as well as the fact that αM =
γ
β
we get:
qit =
γ
βˆsMit
sLit (lit − kit) + γ
βˆ
(mit − kit) + γkit + ait (17)
where we replace β with βˆ. Finally, using (11) to substitute for ait and (13) to substitute for
ait−1 we obtain:
qit =
γ
βˆ
sLit
sMit
(lit − kit) + γ
βˆ
(mit − kit) + γkit
+ φˆa
γ
βˆ
LHSit−1 − φˆaγkit−1 − φˆa
(
rit−1
γ
βˆsMit−1
− qit−1
)
+ νait. (18)
Note that the only unobservable in (18) is the white noise term νait while the only pa-
rameter left un-identified is the scale parameter γ. However, this time we cannot proceed
with least squares because νait is correlated with the regressors and in particular with lit,
sLit, mit and sMit. Indeed, νait affects ait and so affects input choices, pricing and revenues.
Nonetheless we can, for example, identify γ from the following zero moment condition:
14This means that, for example, we do not exploit the non-linear constraint b3=-b1b2. We can certainly do
this at the cost of using non-linear least squares. Furthermore, by exploiting parameters’ constraints we could
actually also estimate αM , and so γ, from (15) without need for further estimations. However, identification of
αM from (15) rests on the reduced form parameter (φλ − φa) being different from zero. In unreported results
we generally fail to reject the hypothesis that (φλ − φa) is equal to zero. By complementing the estimation
with a second stage quantity equation we avoid these issues while at the same time (φλ − φa) being zero does
not affect identification of γ in the second stage.
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E {νaitkit} = 0
applied to equation (18). We can implement this restriction in a linear regression framework
by writing (18) as:
LHSit = b6z6it + νait (19)
where:
LHSit = qit − φˆaqit−1
z6it =
1
βˆ
sLit
sMit
(lit − kit) + 1
βˆ
(mit − kit) + kit + φˆa
βˆ
LHSit−1 − φˆakit−1 − rit−1 φˆa
βˆsMit−1
as well as b6=γ and z6it is instrumented with kit. We set γˆ=bˆ6 and are in turn able to identify
productivity shocks, demand shocks and markups:
aˆit = qit − γˆ
βˆ
sLit
sMit
(lit − kit)− γˆ
βˆ
(mit − kit)− γˆkit (20)
µˆit =
γˆ
βˆsMit
(21)
λˆit =
γˆ
βˆsMit
rit − qit. (22)
Finally, standard errors of βˆ, φˆa and γˆ can be obtained via bootstrapping by re-sampling
residuals in regressions (15) and (19).
3 Data
Our primary data consists of firm-level production data for Belgian manufacturing firms
coming from the Prodcom database and provided by the National Bank of Belgium. Prodcom
is a monthly survey of industrial production established by Eurostat for all EU countries in
order to improve the comparability of production statistics across the EU by the use of a
common product nomenclature called Prodcom (8-digit codes whose first four digits come
from NACE codes). Prodcom covers production of broad sectors C and D of NACE Rev.
1.1 (Mining and quarrying and manufacturing), except for sections 10 (Mining of coal and
lignite), 11 (Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas) and 23 (Manufacture of coke and
12
refined petroleum products). During our sample period, each Belgian firm with 10 employees
or more - or with a revenue greater than a certain threshold in a given year - had to fill out
the survey.15 Firms in the survey cover more than 90% of Belgian manufacturing production
and the raw data is aggregated from the plant-level to the firm-level.
This gives us a sample of about 7,000 firms a year over the period of 1995 to 2007.
Data is organised by product-year-month-firm. We use information on quantity (the unit of
measurement depending on the specific product) and value (Euros) of production sold. We
aggregate the data at the firm-year-product level. The same data has been previously used
in Bernard et al. (2012b) in their analysis of carry along trade as well as by De Loecker et al.
(2014) for their study of the links between international competition and firm performance.
We also make use of more standard balance sheet data to get information on firms’ inputs.
We build on annual firm accounts from the National Bank of Belgium. For this study, we
selected those companies that filed a full-format or abbreviated balance sheet between 1996
and 2007 and with at least one full-time equivalent employee. The resulting dataset has been
previously used in Behrens et al. (2013), Mion and Zhu (2013) and Muls and Pisu (2009)
and is representative of the Belgian economy. It includes information on FTE employment,
material costs, capital stock and turnover. There are more than 15,000 manufacturing firms
per year displaying non-missing values for these variables.
Besides, we use standard EU-type micro trade data at the product-country-firm-month
level over the period 1995-2008 provided by the National Bank of Belgium. From this data
we simple borrow information on firm export status. The data has been previously used
in Behrens et al. (2013), Mion and Zhu (2013) and Muls (2015) among others. The three
datasets are matched by the unique firm VAT identifier
We focus on the period 1996-2007 for which all three datasets are available and during
which there has not been any major change in data collection and data nomenclatures (such as
the NACE nomenclature and 4-digits level Prodcom codes, etc.).16 We choose not to analyse
multi-product firms in this paper and focus on single-product firms to better highlight our
contribution. At the same time, by restricting the analysis to single product firms, we feel
more comfortable with the assumption, also made in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) and
De Loecker et al. (2015) among others, that firms take input prices as given.
As in previous studies using either revenue or quantity data our estimations are run
at a more aggregate level (labelled as “industry” here) rather than at the finest available
classification (8-digits products). However, this means we need to aggregate products that
15Rules are somewhat different for other EU countries. In particular some EU countries only surveyed firms
with 20 or more employees. The 10 employees threshold has been recently increased to 20 in Belgium as well.
16As reported in, for example, Bernard et al. (2012b) there have been quite a few changes in 8-digit level
Prodcom codes during our sample period. Yet these changes occurred within 4-digit level Prodcom codes and
are thus not problematic in our analysis. Indeed the first 4 digits of Prodcom codes come from the NACE
nomenclature who remained virtually unchanged over our time span.
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are sometimes quite different from each other. This is a problem also faced by other studies
using physical production data including Foster et al. (2008) and Dhyne et al. (2014) and
for which, to the best of our knowledge, the common practice is to find the right balance
between the number of observations and level of disaggregation and simply sum quantities
across products within a firm.17 We improve on the existing practice by using the average
(across firms) log price for each product j as a weight in the aggregation. We fully spell out
in Appendix E the assumptions that make this approach meaningful. We further note that
our results are qualitatively and, to a large extent also quantitatively, not affected by this
choice.
Given that products belonging to a given NACE 3 digits code may have different units
of measurement, we define an industry as a NACE 3 digit-unit of measurement pair. This
means there are roughly 200 industries in the dataset. The following cleaning and restrictions
are applied to focus on single-product firms and to have enough observations:
• Consider only firm-year observations for which the value and quantity of production for
all products (8-digit) are recorded.
• Consider only firm-year observations for which employment, materials, sales and capital
are available.
• Aggregate production data at the 3 digit-unit of measurement level. See Appendix E
for further details.
• Create for each firm-year the production value shares of its different 3 digit-unit of
measurement products and keep a firm-year couple only if > 95% of production value
is within a given 3 digit-unit of measurement: single-product firms.
• Apply small trimmings (1% up and down) based on capital intensity, share of interme-
diates in revenues and unit prices.
• Consider only industries with more than 80 firms in each year.
In doing so, we end up with four industries on which we will focus our empirical analysis:
1. NACE 151: “Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products”
2. NACE 212: “Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard”
3. NACE 266: “Manufacture of articles of concrete, plaster and cement”
17De Loecker et al. (2015) also run productivity estimations at an aggregate two-digit level but use in-
formation on detailed product prices to devise an estimation strategy that avoids the issue of aggregating
quantities.
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4. NACE 361: “Manufacture of furniture”
It is worth noting is that the industry with NACE 266 is not “Ready mixed concrete” but
rather “Manufacture of articles of concrete, plaster and cement”. The former industry has
been the object of numerous studies (Syverson, 2004; Foster et al., 2008) and is considered a
rather homogeneous good which is at best differentiated in terms of the geographic location of
firms. “Manufacture of articles of concrete, plaster and cement” is a quite different industry,
featuring products that are far from being homogeneous.
4 Results
In this Section we provide a number of descriptive statistics about our estimations, our mea-
sures of productivity shocks, demand shocks and markups and examine how the three dimen-
sions of heterogeneity correlate with each other in a cross section as well as across time.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Our main contribution is to provide a framework that simultaneously allows recovering het-
erogeneity in demand, TFP and markups. Heterogeneity in demand is a particularly novel
dimension of our analysis and, before going into any estimations, we believe there is value
in showing how much such heterogeneity is present in the raw data. This is accomplished
in Figure 1 where we show, for each of the four industries in our analysis, the plot of log
price and log quantity stemming from the raw data. It is made clear that firms can sell very
different quantities even though they charge the same price (different values on the X-axis
for a given value of Y-axis). This is not per se evidence of heterogeneity in demand because
such a feature might be, for example, generated with Cournot competition among firms with
different costs but facing the same overall demand. Yet Figure 1 also points to firms sell-
ing similar quantities while charging very different prices (different values on the Y-axis for
a given value of X-axis) which is more revealing of demand heterogeneity. Also note that
differences are remarkably large considering we are using log prices and quantities.
Turning to estimations, Table 1 shows the mean and standard deviation of µ, a and λ
across firms in each of the four industries. Average markups range from 1.214 for “Manu-
facture of articles of concrete, plaster and cement” to 1.411 for “Manufacture of furniture”.
Magnitudes are comparable to those obtained by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) under
different specifications. Though, the standard deviation is relatively small as compared to
the 0.5 reported in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). This implies that the vast majority of
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our firm-level markups is indeed above the economically meaningful threshold of one. This is
more evident in Figure 2 where we provide the density distribution of µ along with the mean
(red vertical line).
As for productivity shocks and demand shocks the mean is not of much importance per
se. The standard deviation is instead meaningful with the one of a being considerably larger
than the 0.26 reported in Foster et al. (2008) for physical TFP. Yet, it has to be considered
that Foster et al. (2008) focus on industries characterized by rather homogeneous products for
which it is reasonable to expect less TFP variability across firms. As far as demand shocks are
concerned the standard deviations are instead in line with the 1.16 figure reported in Foster
et al. (2008). Interestingly, in our analysis demand shocks display at least as much variability
as productivity shocks. This can be further appreciated in Figure 3 where we provide the
(centered) density distributions of λ and a. This is an important finding suggesting that
heterogeneity in demand is a key component of firm idiosyncracies being at least as sizeable
as heterogeneity in productivity.
Finally, Table 1 provides our production function estimates for the coefficients of materials
(αM), labour (αL) and scale (γ) along with bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications).
Estimates are in line with previous findings in the literature. In particular, there is evidence
for moderate increasing returns to scale for quantity-based production functions which is
in line with the findings of De Loecker (2011). Furthermore, bootstrapped standard errors
suggest our estimates are overall rather precise.
4.2 Cross-sectional correlations
Table 2 reports cross-sectional correlations between µ, λ and a as well as log price p. The
Table provides several insights.
The first thing worth noting is that the correlation between demand and productivity
shocks is far from being zero. A zero correlation is the identification hypothesis for demand
shocks in Foster et al. (2008). Here, we find that productivity shocks a are very strongly and
negatively correlated with demand shocks λ in each of the four industries we consider. This
finding is suggestive of a trade-off between the quality of a firm’s products (as measured by
λ) and their production cost (as measured by a). Consider, for example, the car industry
where there is the co-existence of manufacturers (like Nissan) producing many cars for a given
amount of inputs (high a) and manufacturers (like Mercedes) producing much less cars for
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a given amount of inputs (low a). At the same time, however, Mercedes produces cars of a
higher quality in that, if the two cars were priced the same, Mercedes would sell many more
cars (higher λ). To be a bit more more specific one of the most productive car plants in
Europe is the Nissan factory located in Sunderland in the UK. In terms of sheer productivity
measured as cars per employee it is nearly 100% more productive than a state of the art
Mercedes plant near Rastatt in Germany. However, this hardly reflects a problem with the
Mercedes plant. Rather, Mercedes and Nissan face very different demands which leads to
different prices as well different markups. Both plants are profitable and perhaps generate a
very similar revenue productivity (we will come back to this issue below). Yet, their business
model is quite different.
The presence of a negative relationship between λ and a can be rationalized in several
ways. For example, it could be the outcome of firms optimally differentiating themselves in
the quality-cost space and/or what is left after selection has taken place and only firms with
high enough a and/or high enough λ survive. The negative relationship we find is far from
being perfect, and so there are indeed firms in the data who have both high (low) λ and a.
Yet, the presence of a negative correlation is a first order feature of the data in our sample.
This can be further appreciated in Figure 4 where we plot the (centered) values of λ and a
in each of the four industries. The strength of the linear relationship is quite apparent from
Figure 4. Furthermore, paying attention to scaling in the two axes, suggests a regression
coefficient of -1, i.e., if the products of a firm are twice as valuable to consumers than the
products of another firm (the former firm has a λ twice as big as the latter) they will be (on
average) twice as costly to produce (the latter firm has an a twice as big as the former).
The second thing worth noting is that markups are reasonably well correlated with de-
mand shocks. More specifically, we find that firms selling higher quality goods charge higher
markups. The relationship between markups and a is instead much weaker and depends on
the specific sector considered. Table 3 offers further insights into the relationship of markups
with demand and productivity shocks. In a model in which the fundamental driver of hetero-
geneity in demand across firms is only λ (like in the Generalized Quadratic Utility case we
consider in Appendix A) we would expect markups µ to vary across firms only to the extent
that λ, a and capital (with the latter two determining marginal costs) vary across firms.
In Table 3 we regress µ on a, λ and capital k. Differences in markups across firms are rea-
sonably well explained (in terms of R2) by differences in demand shocks, productivity shocks
and the capital stock. However, there is a considerable amount of unexplained heterogene-
ity. Therefore, the higher flexibility of the Generalised CES as compared to the Generalized
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Quadratic Utility seems to be needed in order to capture markups heterogeneity across firms.
Furthermore, our results indicate, to the extent that a comparison can be made, that firms
with higher productivity charge ceteris paribus, i.e., controlling for λ and k, higher markups.
This is in line with preferences featuring increasing relative love for variety (from which pro-
competitive effects can be rationalised) and the presence of market distortions such that the
market leads to too little selection with respect to the social optimum.18
One last thing to note about Table 2 is the extremely strong correlation between log prices
p and TFP a ranging from -0.916 to -0.956. This finding is in line with evidence reported
in Foster et al. (2008) and was one of the grounds for their choice to instrument prices with
TFP. Yet the correlation between prices and demand shocks is also very strong ranging from
0.691 to 0.926. The correlation with markups is instead much weaker ranging from not being
significant to 0.213.
4.3 Correlations across time and predictive power
Numerous studies on productivity report a high degree of persistency across time while Foster
et al. (2008) document a similar behavior for their measure of demand shocks. While based
on a different approach and data type our analysis confirms these findings. Table 4 reports
estimations. In each case we regress a, λ and µ on their respective time lag. Both a and λ
are characterized by a high degree of time persistency with autoregressive coefficients being
around 0.9 and an R2 of 0.8 or above. This evidence supports our choice of a simple Markov
process for a and, most importantly, λ. Turning to markups they are relatively less persistent
with the autoregressive coefficient scoring around 0.8 and an R2 of 0.7.
Before moving on to the next section, to a more systematic comparison of our measures
of heterogeneity with those obtained from other methodologies, we end this section providing
a feeling of their predictive power. This is accomplished in Tables 5 to 7 where we regress,
respectively, log price p, log quantity q and log revenue r on a, λ, µ and log capital k. In our
model p, q and r should ultimately be a (non-linear) function of the primitives of the model:
a, λ, µ and k. Though being an approximation the linear regression gives us, by means of
the R2, a feeling about the predictive power of the model. An inspection of the three tables
reveals our model scores extremely well for log prices with R2 of around 0.95. As for log
quantities, results are more modest attaining R2 of about 0.65. Considering the last Table
we have R2s slightly below those of q which is not surprising given the results of the previous
two Tables and the fact that r=p+q.
18See Dhingra and Morrow (2012) and Zhelobodko et al. (2012) for further details.
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5 Comparison to other methodologies
5.1 TFP
In order to gain insights into how and to what extent our methodology to measure TFP differs
from other approaches we have computed additional TFP estimates based on:
• The GMM version of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) incorporating the Ackerberg et al.
(2015) correction as implemented in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012): DLW
• A GMM version of Olley and Pakes (1996): OP
• Industry costs shares as in Foster et al. (2008): FHS
• Ordinary Least Squares: OLS
For each case we have computed a revenue-based TFP (using revenue as a measure of output)
and a quantity-based TFP (using physical quantity as a measure of output).
Our results suggest the following. First, there is considerable difference between revenue-
based and quantity-based TFP. This has already been documented in Foster et al. (2008)
using FHS productivity estimates. Our findings extend this result to a broader set of TFP
measurement approaches while pointing to more substantial differences. For example, Foster
et al. (2008) report a correlation between the two TFP of 0.64.19 We instead find the following
correlations (across all industries while subtracting the mean) between revenue-based and
quantity-based TFP:20
• DLW, quantity and revenue based: 0.380***
• OP, quantity and revenue based: 0.0929***
• FHS, quantity and revenue based: 0.0863***
• OLS, quantity and revenue based: 0.0921***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Second, the correlations (across all sectors while demeaning) between our quantity TFP mea-
sure a and quantity TFP measures computed with other methods are:
• DLW, quantity based: 0.866***
19The closest (to our) revenue TFP measure used in Foster et al. (2008), is what they label “Traditional
TFP”.
20As already noted earlier, Foster et al. (2008) focus on industries characterized by rather homogeneous
products for which it is reasonable to expect less differences in prices and so a closer relationship between
revenue-based and quantity-based TFP.
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• OP, quantity based: 0.948***
• FHS, quantity based: 0.935***
• OLS, quantity based: 0.948***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Therefore, the key message is that having quantity TFP is the key thing. The specific method-
ology is certainly important and our approach has the advantage of allowing TFP measure-
ment within a framework where both markups and demand heterogeneity are present and
potentially correlated with TFP shocks. However this is, to some extent, a second order prob-
lem. This lends support to Syverson (2011) in that: “the inherent variation in establishment-
or firm-level microdata is typically so large as to swamp any small measurement-induced dif-
ferences in productivity metrics.”
Where our framework delivers its full potential and ultimately provides a contribution
is not in getting the TFP “more right” than in other methodologies but rather in allowing
to unravel many dimensions of heterogeneity potentially correlated with each other. These
dimensions of heterogeneity, namely TFP shocks, demand shocks and markups, can in turn
be used to get richer and deeper insights into important questions. Consider, for example,
revenue TFP. Revenue TFP could be defined in our framework as TFPRit ≡ rit − q¯it where
q¯it ≡ qit − ait = αL (lit − kit) + αM (mit − kit) + γkit. By further using Equation (9) and
substituting we get:
TFPRit =
1
µit
(ait + λit) +
1− µit
µit
q¯it (23)
So TFPRit is a function of a, λ, µ and production scale. Tables 8 to 11 provide insights
into the usefulness of this approach. In these four tables we regress DLW, OP, FHS and
OLS revenue based productivities on a, λ and µ while reporting Beta coefficients. These
tables are meant to highlight how, putting aside the issue of getting the revenue TFP “more
right”, differences in measured TFP are a mixture of underlying differences in physical TFP,
demand and markups. Interestingly, in most instances variation in revenue TFP is actually
attributable mainly to variation in demand across firms (λ and µ) rather than in quantity
TFP. At the same time λ typically explains more variation than µ.
5.2 Markups
De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) provide the first fully-fledged framework to compute markups
at the firm-level. We share with them a few assumptions and so the question of how our
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markups compare to theirs arises naturally.
In both our framework and theirs, markups are obtained as the ratio of the estimated
output elasticity of a variable input, free of adjustment costs (materials in our case with
constant elasticity αM), to the share of that input’s expenditure in total sales. Therefore,
provided both methods deliver the same estimate for αM , markups will be identical. Even
if the αM were different, the correlation between the two sets of markups would be actually
one. Only to the extent that getting the level of markups (and so the value of αM) right is
important to the analysis they would thus be different. Our methodology has the advantage
of not requiring proxies for markups and demand shocks while allowing us to quantify both
of these heterogeneities. DLW methodology has the advantage of not requiring quantity data
while being applicable to a wider range of market structures. We believe the right choice
ultimately depends upon the specific data available and industry.
A substantial difference between the two methodologies arises when unobservable (to the
firm) productivity shocks enter into the analysis. De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) propose
a correction to the markups formula to take into account such shocks. When applying their
correction in our data we get a (significant at the 1%) correlation (across all sectors while de-
meaning) between the two sets of markups of only 0.0633. The difference is clearly substantial
and calls for a serious evaluation of both the importance of productivity shocks unobservable
to the firm as well as the capacity of the proxy variable approach to separate observable and
unobservable (to the firm) shocks.
To gain further insights, Table 12 provides average markups across the four industries
computed with our methodology (µ), DLW quantity-based productivity (DLW1) and DLW
quantity-based productivity with correction for unobservable (to the firm) productivity shocks
(DLW2). Table 12 shows such averages are reasonably similar in all industries with the
exception of industry 361 where DLW2 markup is substantially higher.
5.3 Demand shocks
In their seminal paper, Foster et al. (2008) use production data of US manufacturing firms,
containing information on both value and physical quantity, to estimate quantity-based TFP
as well as demand shocks. They measure demand shocks as the residual of a regression
where log quantity is regressed on log price and the latter is instrumented with TFP obtained
using industry costs shares to measure production function parameters (FHS TFP). The key
identifying assumption in their framework is thus that productivity shocks are uncorrelated
with demand shocks. We instead assume that demand shocks follow a Markov process while
not imposing restrictions on their correlation with TFP shocks.
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In light of our framework, the Foster et al. (2008) approach is problematic for at least two
reasons:
1. Markups are heterogeneous across firms: this means that the log price coefficient in their
regression should be firm-specific. Within our framework we do not need to estimate
those firm-specific coefficients because, based on our assumptions, they equal −ηit =
− µit
µit−1 .
2. Demand shocks are strongly correlated with productivity shocks: this means that their
IV strategy would not work in our data. Within our framework we do not need to
take a stand on the correlation between demand and productivity shocks. Equation (9)
provides us with sufficient means to measure demand shocks once we have estimated
TFP and markups.
In order to gain insights into the differences between the two approaches we have followed
Foster et al. (2008) and computed demand shocks as the residual of a regression where log
quantity is regressed on log price and the latter is instrumented with FHS TFP.21 Figure
5 shows a plot of λ and FHS demand shocks for our four industries. Though positively
correlated (correlations in Table 13 range from 0.231 to 0.414) the two sets of demand shocks
are clearly quite different and can potentially lead to completely different conclusions when
used to answer a specific research question.
To be fair, our λ does not precisely correspond to the definition of demand shocks in Foster
et al. (2008). Nevertheless, we can still define demand shocks as the residual component of
model where log quantity is regressed over log price within our framework. From (5) we have
qit = −ηitpit + (ηit − 1)λit − ηit lnκt and the residual component is thus (ηit − 1)λit − ηit lnκt
rather than simply λit. We do not observe lnκt but we do observe qit + ηitpit = (ηit − 1)λit −
ηit lnκt. Figure 6 shows a plot of our residual demand shocks (as measured by qit+ηitpit) and
FHS demand shocks. Again, though being positively correlated (the even smaller correlations
in Table 14 now range from 0.058 to 0.299) the two sets of demand shocks are quite different.
21Foster et al. (2008) also control for a set of demand shifters, including a set of year dummies as well
as the average income in the plant’s local market m where local markets are defined based on Bureau of
Economic Analysis’ Economic Areas. We also include in our regressions a full battery of year dummies. Yet,
given the small size of Belgium we did not include any control for the plant’s local market income. Our IV
estimations, available upon request, deliver highly (1%) significant coefficients for the log price coefficient in
all four industries (point estimates are -1.4189, -1.4327, -.8850 and -1.1524 for industries 151, 212, 266 and
361 respectively).
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In sum, we believe our methodology is to be preferred to measure demand shocks because
it is actually more flexible and explicit than Foster et al. (2008) while having the same data
requirements.
6 An application to export status and firm size
6.1 Export status
Exporting firms are typically found to be more productive than non-exporters. The empirical
evidence is vast (see Bernard et al., 2012a) while at the same time there are good reasons to
believe the direction of causality goes from productivity to export status via a self-selection
mechanism (Bernard and Jensen, 1999).22 This mechanism has been first fully spelled out in
Melitz (2003) and has been the basis of a very prolific and influential theoretical and empirical
literature (Helpman et al., 2015).
Yet empirical evidence is based only on revenue-based measures of productivity and, as
seen in Section 5.1, these measures are a mixture of actual physical TFP, demand shocks
and markups. On the theory side, the mainstream approach relies on one dimension of
heterogeneity across firms only (TFP), with heterogeneity in demand not receiving much
attention.23. Yet, Melitz (2003) acknowledges that in his framework higher productivity can
be either considered as producing a symmetric variety at lower marginal cost or producing
a higher quality variety at equal cost. In what follows, we build on the three measures of
heterogeneity to offer novel and sharper insights on the relationship between firm export
status, productivity and demand.
We first start by showing that the usual positive correlation between revenue-based TFP
and firm export status holds in our data. Tables 15 and 16 report results (Beta coefficients) of
a linear estimation where the export status of a firm is regressed on its OP and DLW revenue-
based TFP respectively. Both sets of estimations convey the same message. Irrespective of the
TFP measure used and industry we find a positive correlation between revenue-based TFP and
firm export status. The availability of physical quantity data allows us to go one step further
and look at the correlation between quantity-based TFP and export status. This is done in
Tables 17 and 18 where we report results (Beta coefficients) of a linear estimation, where
firm export status is regressed on its OP and DLW quantity-based TFP respectively. Tables
17 and 18 indicate that the positive correlation between export status and revenue-based
22Interestingly, in a recent paper Garcia-Marin and Voigtla¨nder (2014) offer some new insights into the
question of learning by exporting. More specifically, they find among new Chilean exporters a decrease in
marginal costs and a stable pattern in revenue-based productivity due to offsetting price changes.
23Some noticeable exceptions include Verhoogen (2008), Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) and Feenstra and Romalis
(2014)
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TFP extends to quantity-based TFP. This provides support to the mainstream theoretical
framework based on differences across firms in term of their ability to produce at a lower
marginal cost.
Yet, within our framework we can go even further and ask whether and how demand and
markups heterogeneity also matters and how it interacts with heterogeneity in productivity. In
this respect it is important to note that our goal here is neither to draw any causal relationships
nor to develop a fully fledged model of export participation with three underlying dimensions
of heterogeneity but rather to uncover correlations that might be useful to further theoretical
contributions.
Turning to the data in Table 19 we consider export status regressed on a, λ and µ while
reporting Beta coefficients. On the one hand Table 19 confirms that the positive correlation
between quantity-based TFP (a) and firms’ export status is overall24 robust to the inclusion of
demand shocks and markups heterogeneity. On the other hand, Table 19 expands the horizon
of the analysis by pointing to the importance of demand heterogeneity in the understanding
of why some firm exports and others do not. Beta coefficients for µ and especially for λ are
in general larger in magnitude than those of a. This suggests that demand heterogeneity is
more important than differences in underlying physical productivity to draw the line between
exporting and non-exporting firms. At the same time, the coefficients’ signs indicate that
exporters typically sell higher quality goods and charge lower markups. The first finding is
quite intuitive while the second can be, for example, rationalized by the fact that exporters
absorb part of the trade costs on their exports so charging, everything else equal, a lower
markup.
6.2 Firm size
Larger firms are typically found to be more productive than smaller ones when using different
measures of productivity. The empirical evidence is abundant and encompasses both devel-
oped (Van Ark and Monnikhof, 1996) and developing (Van Biesebroeck, 2005) countries. At
the same time there are several models consistent with this relationship being, on average,
true in a cross section of firms (Jovanovic, 1982; Lucas Jr, 1978). Yet on the empirical side
only revenue based on measures of productivity have been used so far, meaning that it is
not clear whether the positive correlation stems from physical TFP and/or demand shocks
24We fail to find a significant relationship in the furniture industry. This might be due to the very high
correlation (-0.910) between a and λ in this industry.
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and/or markups. This mirrors the situation on the theory side, where the underlying differ-
ences across firms are typically in terms of their ability to turn inputs into output and not
much in terms of the demand they face - meaning that the distinction between revenue-based
and quantity-based productivity is to a large extent immaterial.
We start by showing that the usual positive correlation between revenue-based TFP and
firm size (as measured by the log number of employees) holds in our data. Tables 20 and 21
report results (Beta coefficients) of a linear estimation where the log number of employees of a
firm is regressed on its OP and DLW revenue-based TFP respectively. Both sets of estimations
convey the same message. Irrespective of the TFP measure used and industry we find a
positive correlation between revenue-based TFP and firm size. The availability of physical
quantity data allows to go one step further and look at the correlation between quantity-
based TFP and firm size. This is done in Tables 22 and 23 where we report results (Beta
coefficients) of a linear estimation where the log number of employees of a firm is regressed
on its OP and DLW quantity-based TFP respectively. Tables 22 and 23 indicate that the
positive correlation between firm size and revenue-based TFP extends to quantity-based TFP.
This provides support to the mainstream theoretical framework based on differences across
firms in terms of their ability to turn inputs into output.
As in the export status case we are in the position of assessing whether demand and
markups heterogeneity also matters and how it interacts with heterogeneity in productivity.
Parallel to that our goal here is again neither to draw any causal relationships nor to develop
any fully fledged model but rather document correlations that might be useful to future
research.
This is achieved in Table 24 where we consider firms’ size regressed on a, λ and µ while
reporting Beta coefficients. On the one hand Table 24 confirms that the positive correlation
between quantity-based TFP (a) and firm size is robust to the inclusion of demand shocks and
markups heterogeneity. On the other hand, Table 24 broadens the spectrum of the analysis
by pointing to the importance of demand heterogeneity in the understanding of why some
firm are larger than others. Beta coefficients for λ and µ are in general smaller in magnitude
than those of a. Yet, their combined effect is comparable to the one of quantity-based TFP
while coefficient signs indicate that larger firms typically sell higher quality goods and charge
lower markups. As in the case of export status the first finding is somewhat intuitive; given
two firms with the same TFP the one with the higher demand shock will be larger. The
second finding is less intuitive and is perhaps related to the fact that most exporters can be
found among larger firms.
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7 Conclusions
We provide a framework that simultaneously allows recovering heterogeneity in productivity,
demand, and markups across firms while leaving the correlation among the three unrestricted.
We do this by systematically exploiting many of the assumptions that are implicit in most
previous firm-level productivity estimation approaches. We apply our econometric framework
to Belgian manufacturing firms and quantify productivity, markups and demand shocks for
four industries. We show how these shocks are correlated among them, across time as well
as with measures obtained from other approaches. We finally asses how and to what extent
our three dimensions of heterogeneity allow us to gain deeper and sharper insights on the
understanding of two key firm-level outcomes: export status and size. Our takeaway message
is that heterogeneity in demand and markups is quantitatively as sizeable as heterogeneity in
productivity and by some measure even more important than the latter in drawing the line
between small and large firms, between firms with higher or lower revenue TFP and between
exporters and non-exporters.
Our methodology is rich enough to be applied to markets where products have some
features of both horizontal and vertical differentiation and builds upon data on physical
production that is becoming increasingly available to researchers (Belgium, Portugal, France,
UK, Denmark, US, India, and Chile to name a few countries). Both elements provide a wide
scope of applications to our framework. At the same time our approach does not simply
allow recovering a consistent measure of TFP while having some other heterogeneities in
the background. It also enables measuring all of the three heterogeneities we consider and
potentially confronts them with many research questions.
Our analysis has policy implications both at the micro and macro level. At the micro
level it makes a big difference to know that some firms or industries lack in competitiveness
because of poor physical TFP (due for example to low expenditure in process R&D) or poor
product quality (due for example to low expenditure in product R&D). At the macro level our
framework allows analyzing aggregate revenue productivity cycles, like the severe downturn
of EU countries (and in particular the UK) revenue productivity since the financial crisis, not
only in terms of changes in some underlying production capacity of the economy but also as
changes in markups and/or demand.
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Table 1: Mean and Standard Deviation
Industry µ λ a αM αL γ
Mean
151 1.257 -13.230 14.000 0.976 0.170 1.109
212 1.304 -13.050 14.120 0.864 0.271 1.146
266 1.214 -13.190 14.160 0.813 0.238 1.068
361 1.411 -13.320 14.310 0.828 0.413 1.273
Standard Deviation
151 0.174 0.614 0.503 0.063* 0.011* 0.039*
212 0.229 0.768 0.591 0.048* 0.015* 0.032*
266 0.235 0.825 0.630 0.060* 0.018* 0.051*
361 0.313 1.163 1.160 0.033* 0.017* 0.036*
Notes: * indicates bootstrapped standard errors (200 replications).
Table 2: Correlations
151 212
µ λ a µ λ a
µ 1 µ 1
λ 0.417*** 1 λ 0.608*** 1
a 0.187*** -0.691*** 1 a -0.063 -0.663*** 1
p 0.020 0.742*** -0.941*** p 0.213*** 0.691*** -0.916***
266 361
µ λ a µ λ a
µ 1 µ 1
λ 0.611*** 1 λ 0.072** 1
a -0.115*** -0.767*** 1 a -0.088*** -0.910*** 1
p 0.143*** 0.791*** -0.956*** p 0.077** 0.926*** -0.940***
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 3: Regression of markup µ on a, λ and log capital k
Industry 151 212 266 361
a .3369*** .2579*** .332*** .0155
(.015) (.0314) (.0141) (.0356)
λ .3259*** .3297*** .374*** .0369
(.0128) (.014) (.0089) (.0355)
k -.0368*** -.0447*** -.0259*** -.0801***
(.0044) (.0055) (.005) (.006)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 .6625 .6491 .6961 .1112
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4: Regression of a, λ and µ on their time lag
Industry 151 212 266 361
a
Lag a .9175*** .9477*** .9138*** .8372***
(.0224) (.0211) (.0172) (.0202)
R2 .8535 .8925 .8825 .7342
λ
Lag λ .8736*** .8944*** .9169*** .8231***
(.0238) (.0246) (.0204) (.0212)
R2 .8135 .8058 .8396 .7096
µ
Lag µ .8013*** .7949*** .8493*** .8743***
(.0309) (.0264) (.019) (.0225)
R2 .6869 .7244 .7381 .7338
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported
here. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Regression of log price p on a, λ and µ and log capital k
Industry 151 212 266 361
a -.8891*** -.6858*** -.6195*** -.4877***
(.0364) (.0571) (.0243) (.0284)
λ .0692* .2005*** .286*** .48***
(.0346) (.0508) (.0235) (.0268)
µ .4421*** -.0371 -.4334*** -.1729***
(.0881) (.1275) (.0564) (.0513)
k -.0729*** -.1229*** -.0674*** -.1351***
(.003) (.0045) (.0031) (.0071)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 .9496 .9357 .9415 .932
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 6: Regression of log quantity q on a, λ and µ and log capital k
Industry 151 212 266 361
a 1.828*** 1.074*** 1.36*** .5458***
(.1563) (.1975) (.102) (.0676)
λ .9423*** .5549** .7749*** -.3654***
(.1543) (.1724) (.1002) (.0665)
µ -4.388*** -1.958*** -1.881*** -.7247***
(.4769) (.4129) (.2218) (.0991)
k .5814*** .7576*** .4271*** .6378***
(.0223) (.029) (.0198) (.0217)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 .6477 .7426 .5734 .6887
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7: Regression of log revenue r on a, λ and µ and log capital k
Industry 151 212 266 361
a .9393*** .388** .741*** .0581
(.1392) (.1474) (.0836) (.0535)
λ 1.012*** .7554*** 1.061*** .1146*
(.1353) (.1332) (.0803) (.051)
µ -3.946*** -1.995*** -2.315*** -.8976***
(.4266) (.3276) (.1818) (.0673)
k .5085*** .6346*** .3596*** .5028***
(.0218) (.022) (.0189) (.0198)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 .6223 .733 .555 .5435
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 8: DLW TFP revenue based regressed on a, λ and µ: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
a 1.236*** .9342*** .9488*** .9733***
(.0197) (.0305) (.0171) (.0167)
λ 1.561*** 1.448*** 1.525*** 1.063***
(.02) (.0265) (.0183) (.0158)
µ -.6635*** -.485*** -.279*** -.2395***
(.0514) (.063) (.0427) (.0226)
# Obs 1233 769 1402 1561
R2 0.558 0.619 0.639 0.263
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported
here. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9: OP TFP revenue based regressed on a, λ and µ: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
a .4062*** .3995*** .6407*** .6387***
(.011) (.0124) (.0101) (.0079)
λ .3678*** .461*** .821*** .6581***
(.011) (.0111) (.0095) (.0077)
µ .4246*** .4022*** .1584** .541***
(.0282) (.0283) (.0214) (.0094)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 0.476 0.496 0.447 0.366
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported
here. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 10: FHS TFP revenue based regressed on a, λ and µ: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
a .254** .1858 .3797*** .2327**
(.0155) (.0217) (.0205) (.0098)
λ .2235* .2986** .5891*** .2656**
(.0156) (.0184) (.0194) (.0097)
µ .2115** .2716*** .0241 .4876***
(.044) (.047) (.0468) (.0127)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 0.159 0.223 0.168 0.250
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported
here. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 11: OLS TFP revenue based regressed on a, λ and µ: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
a .4153*** .3812*** .6245*** .6486***
(.0106) (.0109) (.0102) (.0077)
λ .3693*** .4339*** .783*** .6583***
(.0107) (.0093) (.0095) (.0072)
µ .4255*** .4519*** .1813*** .572***
(.0284) (.0234) (.0232) (.0085)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 0.464 0.523 0.429 0.392
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported
here. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications).
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12: Comparison of average markups between our methodology and DLW
Industry µ markup DLW1 markup DLW2
151 1.257 1.283 1.464
212 1.304 1.050 1.189
266 1.214 1.304 1.533
361 1.411 1.324 2.582
Table 13: Correlation between λ and FHS demand shocks
Industry correlation
151 0.294***
212 0.414***
266 0.238***
361 0.231***
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Table 14: Correlation between our residual demand shocks and FHS demand shocks
Industry correlation
151 0.217***
212 0.299***
266 0.058
361 0.162***
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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Table 15: Export status regressed on OP revenue-based TFP: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
OP TFP Revenue .4428*** .3651*** .2075*** .4219***
(.0128) (.0202) (.0232) (.0153)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 0.223 0.161 0.0512 0.206
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here. Boot-
strapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
Table 16: Export status regressed on DLW revenue-based TFP: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
DLW TFP revenue .4249*** .4094*** .4072*** .4378***
(.0705) (.0603) (.0533) (.0319)
# Obs 1233 769 1402 1561
R2 0.209 0.196 0.172 0.219
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here. Boot-
strapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table 17: Export status regressed on OP quantity-based TFP: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
OP TFP quantity .3646*** .2247*** .0359 .2706***
(.0134) (.0172) (.0164) (.0079)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 0.161 0.0804 0.0105 0.102
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 18: Export status regressed on DLW quantity-based TFP: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
DLW TFP quantity .2649*** .2572*** .0665* .3248***
(.0256) (.0243) (.0215) (.0083)
# Obs 1233 769 1402 1561
R2 0.0995 0.0961 0.0136 0.134
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here. Boot-
strapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 19: Export status regressed on a, λ and µ: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
a .5184*** .3714*** .4297*** .108
(.0523) (.0388) (.0407) (.0243)
λ .6062*** .6067*** .7451*** .0205
(.0481) (.0364) (.0402) (.0244)
µ -.4762*** -.3782*** -.2456*** -.221***
(.1321) (.1027) (.0889) (.0393)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 0.126 0.119 0.117 0.0889
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported
here. Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 20: Log number of employees regressed on OP revenue-based TFP: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
OP TFP Revenue .5882*** .7237*** .557*** .6863***
(.036) (.0523) (.0456) (.0383)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 0.348 0.524 0.316 0.470
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 21: Log number of employees regressed on DLW revenue-based TFP: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
DLW TFP revenue .7855*** .7664*** .7994*** .8514***
(.1171) (.107) (.0789) (.0505)
# Obs 1233 769 1402 1561
R2 0.620 0.590 0.640 0.719
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here. Boot-
strapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 22: Log number of employees regressed on OP quantity-based TFP: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
OP TFP quantity .353*** .3565*** .2492*** .212***
(.0314) (.0487) (.0386) (.0153)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 0.131 0.135 0.0751 0.0461
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 23: Log number of employees regressed on DLW quantity-based TFP: BETA COEFFI-
CIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
DLW TFP quantity .3285*** .3737*** .1384*** .3854***
(.0461) (.0589) (.0398) (.0169)
# Obs 1233 769 1402 1561
R2 0.113 0.148 0.0329 0.149
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here. Boot-
strapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
Table 24: Log number of employees regressed on a, λ and µ: BETA COEFFICIENTS
Industry 151 212 266 361
a 1.11*** 1.021*** .9931*** .341***
(.1236) (.1523) (.0764) (.0427)
λ .7612*** .4728*** .4961*** .2496***
(.1339) (.1643) (.0752) (.0439)
µ -.5233*** -.5128*** -.2275*** -.2184***
(.275) (.3911) (.1655) (.0636)
# Obs 1235 770 1402 1566
R2 0.291 0.290 0.289 0.0708
Notes: Time dummies are included in estimations but are not reported here.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis (200 replications). *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 1: How Important is Demand Heterogeneity? Plot of Log Price and Log Quantity
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Figure 2: Density of µ. Red vertical line corresponds to the mean markup
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Figure 3: Density of λ and a
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Figure 4: Plot of λ and a
Meat Paper
-
2
0
2
4
De
m
an
d 
Sh
oc
k 
La
m
bd
a
-2 -1 0 1 2
TFP shock a
-
2
-
1
0
1
2
3
De
m
an
d 
Sh
oc
k 
La
m
bd
a
-3 -2 -1 0 1
TFP shock a
Concrete Furniture
-
2
0
2
4
De
m
an
d 
Sh
oc
k 
La
m
bd
a
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2
TFP shock a
-
4
-
2
0
2
4
De
m
an
d 
Sh
oc
k 
La
m
bd
a
-4 -2 0 2 4
TFP shock a
42
Figure 5: Plot of λ and FHS demand shocks
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Figure 6: Plot of our residual demand shocks and FHS demand shocks
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Appendix
In Appendices A to D we show how to extend our framework to more general preferences,
forms of imperfect competition other than monopolistic competition as well as to a wider set
of production functions and processes for productivity and demand shocks. In Appendix E
we instead spell out the assumptions allowing us to deal with the issue of aggregation.
A Preferences
There are various ways to extend our model and estimation methodology to preferences other
than the baseline generalized CES case. One possibility is to identify a class of preferences
under which the key equation (9) holds as a first-order linear approximation and then to mod-
ify the estimation procedure accordingly. Another possibility is to fully specify an alternative
preference structure and work out the corresponding algebra for the estimation equations.
We discuss the former case in Section A.1 while the latter case is presented in Section A.2
A.1 First-order linear approximation
The key property we want preferences to satisfy is that the elasticity of prices with respect
to output quantity differs from the elasticity of prices with respect to the demand shock by
one: ∂pi
∂λi
= ∂pi
∂qi
+ 1. There are different ways of achieving this. One way is to start from direct
utility. Consider a representative consumer who maximises a differentiable utility function
U(.) subject to budget B:
max
Q
{
U
(
Q˜
)}
s.t.
∫
i
PiQidi−B = 0 (A-1)
where Q˜ is a vector of elements ΛiQi. Therefore, while the representative consumer chooses
quantities Q, these quantities enter into the utility function as Q˜ and Λi can be interpreted as
a measure of quality for variety i. For example, in the symmetric (with respect to Q˜) varieties
case, the representative consumer would be indifferent between having one more unit of a
variety with Λi = Λ or Λ more units of a a variety with Λi = 1.
The first order conditions of the utility maximization problem imply:
∂U
∂Qi
=
∂U
∂Q˜i
∂Q˜i
∂Qi
=
∂U
∂Q˜i
Λi = κPi
where κ is a Lagrange multiplier and ∂Q˜i
∂Qi
= Λi. Taking logs we have:
ln
∂U
∂Q˜i
+ λi = lnκ+ pi. (A-2)
I
Solving all of these conditions would give us demand functions for all varieties including
that of firm i. However, even if we knew the exact form of U (.), this might be tricky to
work out. Nonetheless, equation (A-2) already tells us a lot about the shape of such demand
functions. On the one hand, differentiating both sides with respect to qi yields:
∂pi
∂qi
=
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂qi
=
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂q˜i
∂q˜i
∂qi
=
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂q˜i
(A-3)
where ∂q˜i
∂qi
= 1 and ∂pi
∂qi
≡ − 1
ηi
. On the other hand, keeping in mind that ∂q˜i
∂λi
= 1 differentiation
of both sides with respect to λi gives:
∂pi
∂λi
=
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂λi
+ 1 =
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂q˜i
∂q˜i
∂λi
+ 1 =
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂q˜i
+ 1 = 1− 1
ηi
i.e., the elasticity of the price with respect to quantity differs from the elasticity of the price
with respect to the demand shock by one. This is the key property needed in our framework.
Let us now consider the implications of these results. Using equation (A-2) we can write
log revenue ri (up to a constant) as:
ri = pi + qi = ln
∂U
∂Q˜i
+ λi + qi = ln
∂U
∂Q˜i
+ q˜i.
Differentiating both sides with respect to q˜i and making use of equation (A-3) we have:
∂ri
∂q˜i
=
∂ ln ∂U
∂Q˜i
∂q˜i
+ 1 = − 1
ηi
+ 1 =
1
µi
and so we finally get:
∆ri ≈
1
µi
∆q˜i =
1
µi
∆(qi + λi). (A-4)
Therefore, for any preferences structure that can be used to model monopolistic competi-
tion and that can be described by a well-behaved differentiable direct utility we can, starting
from the baseline formulation U (Q), introduce quality in such a way that equation (A-4)
is satisfied. The advantage of equation (A-4) is that it can be directly used for estimations
without the need to explicitly solve for the demand functions of the different varieties.
One interesting example is the Generalized CES (Spence, 1976):
U(Q˜) =
∫
i∈I
ai
(
Q˜i
)bi
di =
∫
i∈I
aiΛ
bi
i (Qi)
bi di
where bi = 1− 1ηi . If we further impose ai =
ηi
ηi−1 not only equation (A-4) holds but we actually
get equation (9): ri =
1
µi
(qi + λi). This is our benchmark case. Other examples of preferences
falling within our class include the CARA preferences used in Behrens et al. (2014) as well as
II
the Translog preferences featuring in Feenstra (2003) and Rodr´ıguez-Lo´pez (2011). Contrary
to CARA preferences in the case of the Translog there is no closed-form expression for the
utility function and the demand system is derived directly from the expenditure function.
Yet the utility function does exists and it is well behaved and so it falls within our class. A
workable Translog framework can be readily obtained by considering that everything works
as if firms sell quantities Q˜ij = QijΛij while charging prices P˜ij = Pij/Λij. Also note that
P˜ijQ˜ij = PijQij by construction and so total consumer expenditure E in terms of Q˜ij is the
same as in terms of Qij. Therefore, one simply needs to substitute log prices p˜ij with pi − λi
in the Translog expenditure function.
Another way of getting the key property we need is to start from demand functions
and work out some constraints. Consider, for example, the Generalised Quadratic Utility
(Di Comite et al., 2014):
U(Q) =
∫
i∈I
aiQ(i)di− 1
2
∫
i∈I
bi [Q(i)]
2 di− ci
2
[∫
i∈I
Q(i)di
]2
+Q0
where Q0 is a numraire good. Because of the presence of a numraire good the Generalised
Quadratic Utility does not fit the above described framework. Yet, one can easily derive
the inverse demand function in this case and impose constraints on ai, bi and ci such that
∂pi
∂λi
= ∂pi
∂qi
+ 1. This is obtained by setting ai = a1Λi, bi = b1 (Λi)
2 and ci = c1Λi, where a1, b1
and c1 are positive constants. The inverse demand will thus be:
Pi = d1Λi − b1Λ2iQi,
where d1 =
(
a1 − c1Q
)
and Q =
∫
i∈I Q(i). The demand shock enters the demand function in
order to ensure that ∂pi
∂λi
= − b1QiΛ2i
Pi
+ 1 = ∂pi
∂qi
+ 1. Therefore:
∂ri
∂qi
=
∂qi
∂qi
+
∂pi
∂qi
= 1 +
∂pi
∂qi
=
1
µi
=
∂pi
∂λi
=
∂qi
∂λi
+
∂pi
∂λi
=
∂ri
∂λi
and we obtain from this equation (A-4):
∆ri ≈
1
µi
(∆qi + ∆λi) =
1
µi
∆ (qi + λi) =
1
µi
∆q˜i.
Moving to the estimation strategy one needs to decide which type of local approximation
(∆) to use. One possibility is consider differences in log revenue (as well as in other variables
needed in the estimation) between a reference firm r and any other firm i. This approach
has the advantage of allowing us to measure demand, productivity ad markups for all firms
as deviations with respect to firm r. However, the drawback is that for firms that are very
different from r the first-order approximation might not be very satisfactory. Yet, one could
additionally invoke the mean value theorem and consider average derivatives, i.e., the average
III
markup and consequently average revenue shares of variable factors between firm r and firm i,
to improve the quality of the approximation. An alternative approach, that we fully develop
below, consists instead in employing time changes. In this respect our findings based on the
benchmark generalized CES case show a strong time persistence of the model’s fundamentals:
productivity shocks, demand shocks and markups. The small time changes should provide
a reasonably good base for our first-order approximation. However, the drawback of this
approach is that we can only measure time changes of demand shocks within a firm. As for
productivity and markups we can instead measure their level for all firms and years.
In what follows we use, for example, ∆rit=rit − rit−1 for revenue. Equations (7) and (8)
still hold in this broader setting and so, by proceeding as before, we get from equation (A-4),
which is the equivalent of equation (9), to the following expression:
L̂HSit ≡ ∆rit − sLit (∆lit −∆kit)− sMit (∆mit −∆kit)
sMit
=
γ
αM
∆kit +
1
αM
(∆ait + ∆λit)
(A-5)
which is the equivalent of equation (10). Combining equations (8) and (A-4) we then have:
∆λit−1 = ∆rit−1
αM
sMit−1
−∆qit−1
while plugging equations (8) and (A-4) into equation (A-5) and re-arranging yields:
∆ait−1 = αM L̂HSit−1 − γ∆kit−1 −
(
∆rit−1
αM
sMit−1
−∆qit−1
)
. (A-6)
Finally, by substituting the last two expressions as well as equation (11) into equation
(A-5) we obtain:
L̂HSit =
γ
αM
∆kit + φaL̂HSit−1 − φa γ
αM
∆kit−1
+ (φλ − φa)
(
∆rit−1
sMit−1
− 1
αM
∆qit−1
)
+
1
αM
(∆νait + ν∆λit) (A-7)
which is the equivalent of equation (14). As in the case of equation (14), equation (A-7) can be
estimated using a linear regression setting and an appropriate change in variables. However,
contrary to equation (14), we cannot simply use OLS here because, for example, νait−1 (which
is included in ∆νait) is correlated with L̂HSit−1,
∆rit−1
sMit−1
and ∆qit−1. A simple way to solve
this issue is to instrument L̂HSit−1,
∆rit−1
sMit−1
and ∆qit−1 with their respective time lags. At the
same time one might worry that capital at time t reacts to demand and productivity shocks
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in t− 1. In this case one might also instrument ∆kit with, for example, ∆kit−2.
Estimation of equation (A-7) delivers βˆ and φˆa that can be used to get an estimate of γ
along the lines of what we show in Section 2. To do so, however, we first need to time-difference
the Cobb-Douglas production constraint:
∆qit = αL (∆lit −∆kit) + αM (∆mit −∆kit) + γ∆kit + ∆ait
and make use of equations (7), (8), (11) and (A-6) to get to:
∆qit =
γ
βˆ
sLit
sMit
(∆lit −∆kit) + γ
βˆ
(∆mit −∆kit) + γ∆kit
+ φˆa
γ
βˆ
L̂HSit−1 − φˆaγ∆kit−1 − φˆa
(
∆rit−1
γ
βˆsMit−1
−∆qit−1
)
+ ∆νait. (A-8)
Equation (A-8) is the equivalent of equation (18) and can be manipulated in a similar
fashion to estimate γ via a linear regression where the only covariate is instrumented with,
for example, ∆kit−1 based on the moment condition E {∆νait∆kit−1} = 0. Productivity shocks
and markups can in turn be computed as before:
aˆit = qit − γˆ
βˆ
sLit
sMit
(lit − kit)− γˆ
βˆ
(mit − kit)− γˆkit
µˆit =
γˆ
βˆsMit
.
However, as far as demand shocks are concerned, only their change over time within a
firm can be measured:
∆λit =
γˆ
βˆsMit
∆rit −∆qit.
A.2 Exact procedure with non log-linear demand
Here we discuss how our model can be extended, without resorting to any linear approxima-
tion, by fully specifying an alternative preference structure. We work out the corresponding
algebra for the estimation equations. We are particularly interested in a flexible structure
leading to a non-log linear demand. One reason why one might choose such a structure is
that it allows for markups varying with equilibrium quantity. Specifically, we look here at an
additively separable utility function shaped like the Gaussian CDF:25
25See Berhold (1973) for further discussion of the Gaussian CDF as a utility function.
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U(q˜) =
∫
i∈I
Φ (q˜i, β0, β1, β2) di
where Φ (·) is the Gaussian cdf, i.e.,
Φ (q˜i) = u (q˜i) =
∫ q˜i
−∞
φ (q˜i) dτ.
The inverse demand function for firm i at time t is consequently:
φ (q˜it)
Qitκt
= Pit
where φ (q˜it) is the Gaussian PDF. In what follows we set φ (q˜it) = exp (−β22 q˜3it + β1q˜it + β0)
but could have equally used more or less involved formulations.
The first thing to note is that the Gaussian utility as specified above implies a downward
sloping demand curve for β1 < 1. Indeed:
∂pit
∂qit
= −3β22 q˜2it + β1 − 1 < 0 for β1 < 1
Moving forward, we ignore terms that are constant across firms and have:
∂ lnφ
∂q˜it
= −3β22 q˜2it + β1 =
∂pit
∂qit
+ 1 =
1
µit
,
as well as:
rit = lnφ (q˜it) .
Using the definition χit = sLit (lit − kit) + sMit (mit − kit) we obtain:
1
3
∂ lnφ
∂q˜it
q˜it = −β22 q˜3it +
1
3
β1q˜it = rit − 2
3
β1q˜it
⇒ rit =
(
1
3
∂ lnφ
∂q˜it
+
2
3
β1
)
q˜it =
(
1
3
1
µit
+
2
3
β1
)
q˜it
=
(
1
3
+
2
3
β1µit
)
χit +
(
1
3
1
µitβ1
+
2
3
)
β1γkit +
(
1
3
1
µitβ1
+
2
3
)
β1(ait + λit)
⇒ rit1
3
1
µitβ1
+ 2
3
=
1
3
+ 2
3
β1µit
1
3
1
µitβ1
+ 2
3
χit + β1γkit + β1(ait + λit).
Further note that:
1
3
+ 2
3
β1µit
1
3
1
µitβ1
+ 2
3
= 1+2β1µit1
µitβ1
+2
= β1µit = β1
αM
sMit
. Hence we can write:
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rit
1
3
sMit
β1αM
+ 2
3
= β1αM
χit
sMit
+ β1γkit + β1(ait + λit),
which implies:
rit =
(
1
3
1
µit
+
2
3
β1
)
(qit + λit.) (A-9)
Equation (A-9) is the equivalent of equation (9). Building on the same logic utilized for
equations (12) and (13) one finally gets:
L˜HSit = β1γkit + φaL˜HSit−1 − φaγβ1kit−1
+
(φλ − φa)
β1
(
rit−1
1
3
sMit−1
β1αM
+ 2
3
)
− (φλ − φa) β1qit−1 + β1 (νait + νλit) . (A-10)
where L˜HSit =
rit
1
3
sMit
β1αM
+ 2
3
− β1αM χitsMit .
Estimation of the various parameters in equation (A-10) can be carried by non-linear
GMM, as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) for example, by considering that the error term
uit = β1 (νait + νλit) is a function of some data as well as of the parameters and by building
on the following moment conditions: E [kituit] = E [kit−1uit] = E [mit−1uit] = E [lit−1uit] =
E [qit−1uit] = E [rit−1uit] = 0. Parallel to the generalized CES case one can avoid exploiting
parameters’ constraints and extract some reduced-form parameters including β1αM and β1γ
as well as φa. In the very same way we recover γ in the generalized CES case via a second
step estimation based on the quantity equation, we can, by using estimates of β1αM , β1γ and
φa, write the quantity equation as a linear expression involving only one unknown parameter
(β1) and one right-hand side variable. Therefore, we can use a simple IV strategy based on
the moment condition E [kitνait] = 0 to identify β1 and so αM , γ and ultimately productivity,
demand and markup shocks.
Notice that
1
µit
= −3β22 q˜2it + β1
Hence
∂ (−3β22 q˜2it + β1)
∂qit
= −6β22 q˜it
while in the simple log-linear form the markup does not depend on equilibrium quantity.
VII
B Other forms of imperfect competition
Our framework can be extended beyond the scope of monopolistic competition. In what
follows we show how to frame it in terms of the model developed in Atkeson and Burstein
(2008). We do not use below the time index to alleviate notation.
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) provide two versions of their model. One is based on quantity
competition while the other is based on price competition. In both cases firms are large enough
to perceive their impact on overall price indices. More specifically a finite number of single-
product firms operates within each industry j where preferences are characterized by a CES
demand with parameter σj. Final consumption is produced by a competitive firm using the
output of a continuum of industries yj for j ∈ [0, 1] as inputs subject to a CES production
function with parameter σ and 1 < σ < σj. Contrary to the monopolistic competition case
a firm i operating in industry j does recognize here that sectoral prices and quantities vary
when that firm changes its quantity or price. For example, in the quantity competition case
Atkeson and Burstein (2008) show that firms charge a markup µij = ηij/(ηij − 1) where ηij
is the perceived elasticity of demand given by:
ηij(sij) =
[
1
σj
(1− sij) + 1
σ
sij
]−1
(B-1)
and sij = PijQij/
∑
i PijQij is the market share of firm i in its sector j. This case falls under
the scenarios considered in Hall (1986) and so equation (7) applies. It is readily verified that
equation (4) also holds. The proof is straightforward and simply requires changing notation
using Q˜ij = QijΛij instead of Qij and P˜ij = Pij/Λij instead of Pij everywhere in the model.
Note that P˜ijQ˜ij = PijQij and so s˜ij = sij. Indeed everything works as if firm i was selling
quantity Q˜ij while charging a price P˜ij. With regards to profit maximization conditions it is
straightforward to show that, for given Λij, the elasticity of P˜ij with respect to Q˜ij, given by
−1/ηij(sij), is the same as the elasticity of Pij with respect to Qij as well as the the elasticity
of P˜ij with respect to Λij. Yet the elasticity of Pij with respect to Λij is different. Given
pij = p˜ij + λij we have:
∂pij
∂λij
=
∂p˜ij
∂λij
+
∂λij
∂λij
=
∂pij
∂qij
+ 1,
i.e., equation (4) holds. The proof for the price competition case in Atkeson and Burstein
(2008) follows the same logic.
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C More general production functions
Here we show how we can introduce more flexible production functions. In particular we look
at a (homogenous) translog form, i.e., our production function takes the form:
qit = ait+
∑
X∈{M,L,K}
[
αX lnXit +
1
2
αXX ln (Xit)
2
]
+αMK lnMit lnKit+αML lnMit lnLit+αLK lnLit lnKit.
Note that,
∂qit
∂mit
= αM + αMMmit + αMKkit + αMLlit
∂qit
∂lit
= αL + αLLlit + αLKkit + αMLmit
γ − ∂qit
∂mit
− ∂qit
∂lit
= αK + αKKkit + αMKmit + αLK lit
where the last equation follows from the homogeneity assumption (as before γ represents
the returns to scale).
We also have that,
∂qit
∂mit
mit +
∂qit
∂lit
lit +
(
γ − ∂qit
∂mit
− ∂qit
∂lit
)
kit
= αMmit +αLlit +αKkit +αMMm
2
it +αLLl
2
it +αKKk
2
it + 2αMKkitmit + 2αMLmitlit + 2αLK litkit
= qit − ait + 1
2
αMMm
2
it +
1
2
αLLl
2
it +
1
2
αKKk
2
it + αMKkitmit + αMLmitlit + αLK litkit
and
qit =
∂qit
∂mit
mit +
∂qit
∂lit
lit +
(
γ − ∂qit
∂mit
− ∂qit
∂lit
)
kit
−1
2
αMMm
2
it −
1
2
αLLl
2
it −
1
2
αKKk
2
it − αMKkitmit − αMLmitlit − αLK litkit + ait.
From the first order conditions,
sMitµit =
∂qit
∂mit
, sLitµit =
∂qit
∂lit
IX
holds, so that
qit = sMitµitmit + sLitµitlit + (γ − sMitµit − sLitµit) kit
−1
2
αMMm
2
it −
1
2
αLLl
2
it −
1
2
αKKk
2
it − αMKkitmit − αMLmitlit − αLK litkit + ait.
In this setting equation (9) holds and so by adding λit on both sides and dividing by 1/µit
one gets:
LHSit
∂qit
∂mit
= (qit + λit)− µit [sLit (lit − kit) + sMit (mit − kit)] (C-1)
= γkit + αMMm
2
it + αLLl
2
it + αKKk
2
it + αMKkitmit + αMLmitlit + αLK litkit + (ait + λit) ,
where LHSit is the same as in equation (10), i.e., a function of observables and ∂qit/∂mit=αM+
αMMmit + αMKkit + αMLlit, i.e., a function of some parameters as well as mit, lit and kit.
By substituting equation (11) to equation (13) into equation (C-1) (while replacing the
old αM with ∂qit/∂mit) and dividing both sides by γ we get:
LHSit
∂qit
∂mit
1
γ
= eit − φaeit−1 + ∂qit/∂mit 1
γ
φaLHSit−1 (C-2)
+ ∂qit/∂mit
1
γ
(φλ − φa)
(
rit−1
sMit−1
− 1
∂qit/∂mit
qit−1
)
+ uit
where eit = kit +
αMM
γ
m2it +
αLL
γ
l2it +
αKK
γ
k2it +
αMK
γ
kitmit +
αML
γ
mitlit +
αLK
γ
litkit and
uit=
1
γ
(νait + νλit).
Estimation of the various parameters in equation (C-2) can be carried by non-linear GMM,
as in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012) for example, by considering that uit is a function of
some data as well as of the parameters, and builds on moment conditions such as E [kituit] =
E [kit−1uit] = E [mit−1uit] = E [lit−1uit] = 0 as well as E
[
m2it−1uit
]
= E [mit−1kit−1uit] =
E [mit−1lit−2uit] = E [kit−2lit−2uit] = 0, and so on and so forth. Considering moments up
to t − 2 (t − 1) there are 30 (13) such moments conditions that can be exploited. As in
the Cobb-Douglas case, it is perhaps best not to exploit parameters’ constraints (this mean
for example estimating αMM
γ
rather than trying to separately identify αMM and γ from the
revenue equation) and extract some reduced form parameters to be used in a second stage
regression based on the quantity equation.
For the quantity equation we have:
X
qit =
∂qit
∂mit
χit
sMit
+γkit−1
2
αMMm
2
it−
1
2
αLLl
2
it−
1
2
αKKk
2
it−αMKkitmit−αMLmitlit−αLK litkit+ait,
(C-3)
where χit = sLit (lit − kit) + sMit (mit − kit). All of the parameters in equation (C-4) have
been identified up to the scaling γ in the previous stage and we can write it as:
qit = γzit + ait, (C-4)
where:
zit =
∂qit
∂mit
1
γ
χit
sMit
+kit−1
2
αMM
γ
m2it−
1
2
αLL
γ
l2it−
1
2
αKK
γ
k2it−
αMK
γ
kitmit−αML
γ
mitlit−αLK
γ
litkit+ait.
As in the Cobb-Douglas case we can further substitute for ait using equation (13) (while
replacing the old αM with ∂qit/∂mit) and use the moment condition E [kitνait] = 0 on a simple
linear model with a single regressor to identify γ and ultimately productivity, demand and
markup shocks.
D More general processes for a and λ
Our model can be easily extended to non-linear Markov processes for a and λ as well as to
the presence of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error in capital.
Consider, for example, the first case and in particular:
ait = φ1aait−1 + φ2aa2it−1 + νait
λit = φ1λλit−1 + φ2λλ2it−1 + νλit. (D-1)
By substituting equations (12), (13) and (D-1) into (10) we obtain:
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LHSit =
γ
αM
kit + φ1aLHSit−1 − φ1a γ
αM
kit−1
+ (φ1λ − φ1a)
(
rit−1
sMit−1
− 1
αM
qit−1
)
+ (φ2λ − φ2a)
(
αM(
rit−1
sMit−1
)2 +
1
αM
(qit−1)2 − 2( rit−1
sMit−1
qit−1)
)
(D-2)
+ φ2a
(
αM(LHSit−1)2 +
γ2
αM
(kit−1)2 − 2γLHSit−1kit−1 − 2αM(LHSit−1 rit−1
sMit−1
)
)
+ φ2a
(
+2γ(kit−1
rit−1
sMit−1
) + 2(LHSit−1qit−1)− 2 γ
αM
(kit−1qit−1)
)
+
1
αM
(νait + νλit) .
Equation (D-2) can be used to estimate γ
αM
≡ β, φ1a and φ2a26 by a suitable linear
regression with a change in variables and some reduced-form parameters. In turn these
estimates could be employed in the corresponding expression of (18):
qit =
γ
βˆ
sLit
sMit
(lit − kit) + γ
βˆ
(mit − kit) + γkit
+ φˆ1a
γ
βˆ
LHSit−1 − φˆ1aγkit−1 − φˆ1a
(
rit−1
γ
βˆsMit−1
− qit−1
)
(D-3)
+ φˆ2a(
γ
βˆ
)2(LHSit−1)2 + φˆ2aγ2(kit−1)2 + φˆ2a(
γ
βˆ
)2(
rit−1
sMit−1
)2 + φˆ2a(qit−1)2
− 2φˆ2aγ
2
βˆ
LHSit−1kit−1 − 2φˆ2a(γ
βˆ
)2LHSit−1
rit−1
sMit−1
+ 2φˆ2a
γ
βˆ
LHSit−1qit−1
+ 2φˆ2a
γ2
βˆ
kit−1
rit−1
sMit−1
− 2φˆ2aγkit−1qit−1 + νait.
from which the γ parameter can be obtained by a suitable linear regression where the de-
pendent variable is qit − φˆ1aqit−1 − φˆ2a(qit−1)2 and the right-hand side variables are grouped
into two sets: one in which the only unknown coefficient is γ and the other where the only
unknown coefficient is γ2. As in the baseline case, instrumenting is needed.
The case of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is easier to handle. In this scenario
we have:
ait = φaait−1 + uai + νait
λit = φλλit−1 + uλi + νλit. (D-4)
26As in the baseline case, β and φ1a can be directly obtained from, respectively, the coefficients of kit and
LHSit−1 with no need to exploit reduced-form parameters constraints. As for φ2a, this can be obtained as
1/2 times the coefficient of the interaction between LHSit−1 and qit−1.
XII
By substituting equations (12), (13) and (D-4) into equation (10) we obtain:
LHSit =
γ
αM
kit + φaLHSit−1 − φa γ
αM
kit−1
+ (φλ − φa)
(
rit−1
sMit−1
− 1
αM
qit−1
)
+
1
αM
(uai + uλi) +
1
αM
(νait + νλit) . (D-5)
Equation (D-5) can be transformed into a linear regression model similar to equation
(15) with the only difference being that, the simultaneous presence of an unobservable time-
invariant component correlated with regressors ( 1
αM
(uai + uλi)) and the lag of the dependent
variable (LHSit−1), calls for the use of, for example, a dynamic panel data estimator rather
than simple OLS. Similar arguments apply to quantity equation (19).
Last but not least the presence of standard measurement error in, for example, capital is
relatively straightforward to accommodate in our framework. Such measurement error would
imply that the error term in equation (14) is correlated with kit and kit−1 and so simple OLS
cannot be used any more. Yet, very much like in Wooldridge (2009), the simple solution to
this problem is to use appropriate instruments for kit and kit−1 like, for example, suitable
lags of capital and inputs. At the same time, the moment condition E {νaitkit} = 0 used to
identify γ in equation (18) would be violated by the presence of measurement error but can,
for example, be replaced by the following alternative:
E {νaitkit−2} = 0.
E Aggregation
We now provide an example in which it makes sense to aggregate quantities produced of
different products within a firm while using average log prices (across firms within a product)
as weights. In terms of our data a product has to be thought of as an 8-digit Prodcom code
produced by a firm belonging to a given industry, i.e., at the 3 digit-unit of measurement
level.
Suppose that firm i produces many products indexed by j and that the log production
function of product j by firm i can be simplified as qij=qi + s
q
j where s
q
j is an Hicks-neutral
shifter specific to the product and constant across firms. Further assume that the log demand
shock corresponding to product j produced by firm i is λij=λi + s
λ
j where s
λ
j is specific to the
product and constant across firms. Now impose markups µij = µi. We thus get:
XIII
rij = pij + qij =
1
µi
(qij + λij) =
1
µi
(sj + qi + λi) =
1
µi
(q˜ij + λi) ,
where sj=s
q
j + s
λ
j and q˜ij = sj + qi. This equation shows that, within our assumptions,
everything works as if the firm was producing identical products, i.e., having the same pro-
ductivity, demand and markup shocks as well as technology constraint, in different quantities
q˜ij. The problem is that qij is directly observable in our data while q˜ij is not. Yet, from the
above equation we get:
pij = rij − qij = 1
µi
(q˜ij + λi)− qi − sqj =
1
µi
(qi + λi)− qi + 1
µi
sj − sqj .
We finally posit E [pij|i ∈ Ij] = a+bsj−sqj where Ij is the set of firms i producing product
j, a=E
[
1
µi
(qi + λi)− qi|i ∈ Ij
]
and b=E
[
1
µi
|i ∈ Ij
]
. This property would be automatically
satisfied if all firms were producing all products within an industry. On a broader basis,
this amounts to assume that the distributions of productivity, markups and demand shocks
corresponding to firms selling a given product are similar across the 8-digit products belonging
to a given industry. We thus allow for the distributions of firm-level productivity, markups
and demand shocks to be different across industries.
The above assumption implies that, by summing the average (across firms within a prod-
uct) log price pij observed in the data to the output of product j by firm i (qij) we get a
monotonous transformation of q˜ij = sj + qi:
E
[
pij|i ∈ Ij
]
+ qij = a+ bsj + qi
that we can use to aggregate outputs of the different products of firm i.
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